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In the policy domain, no one seems to have asked to what extent the theoretical foundations for
structural reform play a role in real-world structural reform programs. Put differently, can extant and
new economic theory on optimality in local government structure explain the observed incidence of
structural reform in actual local government jurisdictions?
B. Dollery and L. Robotti
Introduction, page 3
The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform, 2008

The debate about the amalgamation of local government units (thereafter LGUs for
simplicity – in Switzerland: “communes” or “Gemeinden”) usually stems from the fact
that LGUs’ political borders (the institutional territory) do no longer coincide with the
economic boundaries required for an efficient provision of most local public services
(the functional territory). And both do not correspond with the relational territory
which arises out of the private and professional activities of LGUs’ residents as they
commute daily or periodically for work, shopping and leisure (Dafflon and Ruegg, 2003:
890). Additional problems are the openness of economic activities and the emergence
of industrial clusters which largely overlap local boundaries. Finally, urban areas and
agglomerations usually regroup several neighbouring LGUs whereas the needs for
specific public services are identical in each of them and require horizontal
cooperation.
The core question of this paper is how to reform the institutional and functional
territories in such a way that public services are delivered efficiently, according to local
preferences and in a way that responds to the needs expressed in the larger relational
territory. For the local public sector, the main concern is the reorganisation in a new,
coherent public institution of the three circles of deciders, beneficiaries and payers,
that is:
- the residents in the commune that vote the provision of a public service
(admittedly, corporate business and business units have no vote),
- the users whose residence or domiciliation can be in but also outside the territory
of the LGU which provides the service and
- the taxpayers when according to the principle of origin, taxation is attributed to
the commune of residence of individuals or legal domiciliation of business
companies.
Several financial or spatial solutions are possible to restore the coincidence between
the three circles. If we abstract from financial transfers, the theoretical and practical
answers are that LGUs should either coordinate horizontally or amalgamate.
Horizontal coordination is possible under various legal regimes, through private
contracts, or through public and administrative law (special service precinct, syndicate
of LGUs and association of communes, for example). In the Swiss context, Della Santa
(1996) was first to explore from the point of view of institutional and political economy
the issues of horizontal cooperation between LGUs under private or public law. Dafflon
and Ruegg (2001) further developed the issues in designing the “optimal” institutional
agglomeration (urban areas), a theme which was thoroughly scrutinized and pursued
by Perritaz (2003b). At the same period, Frey and Eichenberger (1999, 2006) proposed
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a totally different approach with the FOCJs, for functional, overlapping and competing
jurisdictions. This paper focuses on the voluntary amalgamation of LGUs, one of the
possible solutions experienced in the Swiss case. But first, three general points deserve
some attention.
 The debate about the size of government units is not new. Olson (1969) discoursed
on the principle of fiscal equivalence between deciders, beneficiaries and payers in the
division of responsibilities among the different levels of government. Following Oates
(1972: 38ss) and King (1984: 50-85), most first generation theories of fiscal federalism
have devoted pages to promoting the “optimal size” of local service precincts. But this
does not help the territorial organisation in practice for at least three reasons. First,
the theory is developed for one service1, whereas LGUs propose a basket of local
public services. Second, it does consider only purely economic arguments, drawing a
flat functional and territorial map, whereas one knows that local territories result from
past history and from social, demographic and geographic environmental variables.
Third, amalgamation is a political and democratic process, not an economic and
technocratic drawing. Practices show other roads (Swianiewicz, 2002; Dollery and
Robotti, 2008).
 The debate divides Europe in two territorial blocks which also correspond to two
political options (Dafflon, 2003: 276-77). Table 1 recapitulates. [1] Between 1952 and
1972, compulsory amalgamation by decision of the centre has been an almost
exclusive specificity of countries in the North of Europe, with a drastic reduction in the
number of LGUs. Compulsory amalgamation in the South (the “Latin” world) was not
successful. [2] From this period, voluntary amalgamation is dominant in the South of
Europe. Switzerland is an interesting border case: except for one canton (Glarus in
2006), all LGUs’ amalgamations have been on a voluntary base including in the German
speaking cantons.

1

On this point, I would urge the profession to stop presenting this approach as a theory of the optimal
size of local government when it is, in fact, the optimal size of one functional service precinct. This is
substantially different and cannot be transposed without important theoretical changes to existing
political government units.
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Table 1
country
Norway

LGUs’ amalgamation policies, Europe, Selected countries
year
1952
1956

Denmark

1958

Sweden

2005
1961

England
Germany

1967
1972
1969

Belgium

1971

France

1971

reference
Committee on the amalgamation of
municipalities
Law on the amalgamation of municipalities
Law on the re-mapping of municipal jurisdictions
Municipal
Reform of June 21, 1975 (effective 2007)
Expert committee on LGUs’ regrouping
“principles on the new mapping of
municipalities”
Radcliff-Maud Report
Law on local governments
Wagner thesis: “Territorial Reform of Local
Government in the Länder” (from 1971 to 1980)
Law of July 23, on the amalgamation of
communes

Number of LGUs
before
after
2007
744

454

1385

275

431

98
2281

278

290

1383

402

354

24386
2669

8501
596

12312
589

Law of July 16, on the amalgamation of
38814
36433
36683
communes
Italy
1971
Creation of regions with “ordinary statute”:
8032
8066
8101
communalization
Spain
1978
Constitution of December 29, 1978
8800
8150
8111
Switzerland
From
Ad hoc cantonal decrees on the amalgamation of
(1970)
(2011)
1973
communes, from canton to canton
2915
2551
2721
Sources: Derycke and Gilbert 1988; Council of Europe, 1995; for 2007: Hoorens, 2008; for Switzerland: Swiss
Statistical Office, various years.

 Too many too small communes is a real preoccupation in European countries2
(Marcou, 2000; Swianiewicz, 2002), but not only. A unique case is that of Quebec.3 In
2000 the Provincial Parliament passed a series of laws that obliged municipalities to
amalgamate (from 212 to 42 communes) for two mains reasons: [1] too much
fragmentation was creating inefficiencies in the delivery of local public services and a
proliferation of spillovers; [2] the proliferation of intermunicipal collaborations reduces
the openness and clarity with respect to decision-making and diminishes political
accountability to residents (Québec, 2000: 20). In the 2002-3 campaign for the
Provincial election, the opposition party (Parti Libéral du Québec - PLQ) promised
legislation changes in order to permit residents to decide through referenda whether
they would maintained the amalgamations that were imposed by the former
government or return to the previous situation. When the opposition came into
power, the “des-amalgamation process” was launched4 not because the previous
reasons were wrong, but because the now-in-power PLQ was against “compulsory”
amalgamation. This move illustrates one of the key problems of LGUs amalgamation:
sound economic arguments versus participative democracy.
2

See also the special issue of «Pouvoirs locaux », no 81 II/2009 on “Territories in the European Union”:
decentralization,
territorial
rationalization
and
local
organization
in
Europe.
http://www.idecentralisation.asso.fr/revue.php
3
Perritaz. 2003a, gives a thorough account of this historical sequence and draw the lessons on
“compulsory” versus “voluntary” amalgamation, and for Switzerland.
4
The des-amalgamation process required a majority of votes (51%) and minimum participation
threshold (35%). The referendum was demanded in 89 pre-amalgamation municipalities. In 58 the result
was the amalgamation status quo and in 31 a des-amalgamation.
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With this foreword in mind, the present paper is divided in six sections. Section one
summarizes the the debate about LGUs’ amalgamation in the Swiss context, past and
present. Past, because without due attention paid to the political history of communal
amalgamations in the cantons, one does not understand the “voluntary” versus
“compulsory” core issue. Present, because despite a modest decrease in the number
of communes (from 3021 in 1990 to 2551 at the end of 2010), Switzerland is the
successful story of voluntary LGUs amalgamations in Europe. Section two tackles the
fundamental problem: if too many LGUs are too small, when is small too small and
why? Horizontal cooperation is one possible solution, but it creates serious problems,
explained in Section 3. Section 4 presents the core concept of “noyaux durs” which is
one of the effective approaches to LGUs amalgamation. Section 5 details the cantonal
financial incentives that are needed to encourage voluntary amalgamation, besides a
cantonal planning strategy and technical help in the process of amalgamation. Section
6 concludes with some notes on the performance of the system.
1 Local governments’ amalgamation in Switzerland: a reminder
The trend of LGUs’ amalgamation in Switzerland is summarized in Table 2 which gives
the decrease in the number of political communes in the cantons for the 1950 – 2011
period together with the average and median population size per commune per
canton. The actual average population per commune is around 3000 – which
corresponds to the lowest figures in the Europa league just before Slovakia, France,
Cyprus and the Czech Republic, all with less that 2000 (Dexia, 2008: 41). The value of
the national median is 1378 residents – but with figure as low as 377 in Graubünden.
Yet, although several cantons have promoted amalgamations through financial
incentives, only three of them, Fribourg, Bern and Ticino, proposed a policy target
before 2000. Seven other cantons have joined the club thereafter, though in most
cases on the basis of a “non-official” reference planning – which really illustrates how
politically sensitive is the issue. Table 3 summarizes and gives the references. Two
cantonal historical paths serve to exemplify the “voluntary” versus “compulsory” issue
and, at the same time, the tension between economic and political variables. One
canton is Fribourg, with the oldest policy experience. The other is Glarus, where
compulsory amalgamation of communes was recently imposed top-down – though
democratically decided - reducing their number from 25 to 3.

6
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Table 2 Number and population size of Swiss communes, per canton
Number of communes
(situation January 1, reference year)

canton

Zurich
Berne
Lucerne
Uri
Schwyz
Obwald
Nidwald
Glarus
Zoug
Fribourg
Soleure
Bâle-Ville
Bâle-Campagne
Schaffhouse
Appenzell Rh.-Ext
Appenzell Rh.-Int
Saint-Gall
Grisons
Argovie
Thurgovie
Tessin
Vaud
Valais
Neuchâtel
Genève
Jura
Total

variation

1950

1990

2000

2005

2009

2011

171
493
107
20
30
7
11
29
11
284
132
3
74
35
20
6
91
221
233
201
257
388
170
62
45
3101

171
412
107
20
30
7
11
29
11
259
130
3
73
34
20
6
90
213
232
179
247
385
163
62
45
82
3021

171
400
107
20
30
7
11
29
11
242
126
3
86
34
20
6
90
212
232
80
245
384
163
62
45
83
2899

171
398
103
20
30
7
11
27
11
176
126
3
86
32
20
6
89
208
231
80
204
381
153
62
45
83
2763

171
392
88
20
30
7
11
25
11
168
125
3
86
27
20
6
86
190
229
80
169
375
143
53
45
64
2624

171
383
87
20
30
7
11
3
11
167
121
3
86
27
20
6
85
178
220
80
157
375
141
53
45
64
2551

1990- 20002000 2011
0
0
-12
-17
0
-20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-26
0
0
-17
-75
-4
-5
0
0
13
0
0
-7
0
0
0
0
0
-5
-1
-34
0
-12
-99
0
-2
-88
-1
-9
0
-22
0
-9
0
0
1
-19
-122 -348

Population 2009
Resident

average

1'332'727
969'299
368'742
35'162
143'719
34'429
40'737
38'370
110'384
268'537
251'830
186'672
271'214
75'303
53'054
15'549
471'152
190'459
591'632
241'811
332'736
688'245
303'241
170'924
446'106
69'822
7'701'856

7'794
2'473
4'190
1'758
4'791
4'918
3'703
1'535
10'035
1'598
2'015
62'224
3'154
2'789
2'653
2'592
5'479
1'002
2'584
3'023
1'969
1'835
2'121
3'225
9'913
1'091
2'935

median
3'403
934
2'175
814
3'041
4'752
3'249
1'001
8'299
930
1'028
20'539
1'273
820
1'689
2'004
3'741
377
1'483
1'936
860
512
969
1'201
2'604
552
1'378

Sources: 2000 à 2009: OFS:http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/01/02/blank/data/01.html;
2010 ; OFS:http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/-nomenklaturen/blank/blank/raum_glied/01.html.
Up-dated information in : http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemeindefusionen_in_der_Schweiz

Table 3

Cantons with a targeted planning in LGUs’ amalgamation (2011)

Canton

Year of planning

Fribourg

1974 /
1999/2011
1998
1998
2000
2001
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2008

Bern
Ticino
Luzern
Valais
Neuchâtel
Vaud
Glarus
Jura
Aargau
Solothurn

Number LGUs
at the time
245

proposal

400
245
107
163
62
381
25
83
229
125

70
86
min. 3000 Hi
n.a.
11
107
3
29
17
Concept to be studied by the
department of local affairs

89

Number of
LGUs 2011
167

Difference
to target
- 78

383
157
87
141
53
375
3
64
220
121

- 313
- 71
?
?
-42
- 268
Ok
- 35
-203
?

Sources : Fribourg Dafflon 2000; Ticino Il cantone e I suoi comuni, Dipartimento delle Instituzioni Sezione Enti locali, Bellinzona,
1998, vol. 2b ; Luzern Regierungsrat "Luzern 99" Massnahmen füreiner Strukturreform im Kanton Luzern, 17 Januar 1997 ; Valais
Commission paritaire pour les relations canton-communes, 4ème rapport relatif aux fusions de communes, Canton du Valais, Sion,
décembre 2000 ; Neuchâtel, Rapport 06.014 du 8 février 2006 du Conseil d'Etat au Grand Conseil à l'appui d'un projet de décret
relatif à l'utilisation du solde du fonds destiné aux réformes de structures des communes ; Vaud Golaz, 2006 ; Solothurn
http://www.so.ch/fileadmin/internet/vwd/vdgem/pdf/gemeindeorganisation/ Glarus see below in the text; Jura Chappuis,
2007 ; Aargau "Unterstützung von Gemeindezusammenschlüssen", Botschaft des Regierungsrats des Kantons Aargau an den
Grossen Rat vom 19. Januar 2011.
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Fribourg
The history of amalgamation in the canton of Fribourg (with three key dates: 1974,
2000 and 2011) is synthetic of the European debate in time and content. One cannot
understand the whole process of voluntary amalgamation in Switzerland without
reference to this case study because the canton of Fribourg has been a key player and
leader in this policy for the last forty years (Dafflon, 1998, 2000 and 2003).
 In the early 70s the Canton’s Executive mandated a study on the “efficient size of
the communes”. The “Gaudard-Piveteau” Report (1971) examined five functions and
proposed two thresholds: communes should count at least 1000 residents for an
efficient local administration, for primary education (with two-degree classes), sport
centre and robust tax resources, and at least 5000 beneficiaries for clean water
networks. The study was not based on theoretical criteria but on cross-section panel
data observation of the actual public expenditures in the communes, which gave some
kind of admitted U-shape average cost curves. The result was a proposal to reduce the
number of communes from 284 to around 90. Following the Report, the cantonal
Executive decided a “Nordist” approach5 with a draft law on the compulsory
amalgamation of communes. The law was accepted on May 21, 1973, in Parliament
with an “87 for - 9 against” vote. The referendum was demanded by a group of citizens
residents in small communes, who finally got the last word. The law was refused in
cantonal vote on May 26, 1974 by 60% of the voters.
The Government’s Message and the minutes of the Parliamentary debates contain all
the pros and cons that were discussed in Europe at the time (Canton of Fribourg, BCG,
1973: 333-369): small is beautiful but expensive, larger would be better which permit
administrative economies, economies of scale and improved efficiency in the
production of local public services, internalization of spillovers, more robust tax bases.
Compulsory amalgamation was justified mainly for economic reasons. Opponents
justified their position on democratic arguments: “voice” and free democratic choice
at the grass root level, no top-down administrative and technocratic process. At the
same time, started a successful campaign for the voluntary amalgamation of
communes, which has reduced their number from 284 (1974) to 167 (2011).
 The amalgamation policy initiated in 2000 for six years was the last, in the cantonal
Executive’s view, to obtain a financial aid. It introduced a substantial change in the
grant system (see below, section 4) aiming at giving a new incentive to the voluntary
amalgamation policy. It was based on a territorial map of voluntary amalgamation
using the new concept of “noyaux forts” (Dafflon, 2000), which would reduce the
number of communes from 245 (1999) to 89.
 In 2006, a Parliamentary motion commanded the Executive to present a “third
phase” law on amalgamation (BGC, 2010: 2252). The objective is to attain less than
100 communes, with an adaptation of the financial incentive. The law was submitted
to compulsory referendum and accepted on May 15, 2011, by 73% of the voters. It will
come into force on January 2012.
5

Fribourg is on the language border between French and German. The canton is official bilingual, as also
is its capital city. The language distribution is around 2/3 French speaking and 1/3 German speaking,
with German speaking communes in the North and North-West of the cantonal territory.
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The 1974-199 voluntary amalgamation policy aimed at merging very small communes
(to a larger neighbour LGU) which had financial problems, mainly insufficient tax base
owing to the new (unfunded) mandated functions assigned to communes
(environmental policy, reform of the hospital network, residences for elderly disabled
persons). In fact, behind the words, it was bail-out policy. The 2000-2005 sequence
aimed at increasing LGUs’ size (number of residents) in order to reinforce their budget
position and financial capacity with tax pooling on a larger base. With the 2012 new
incitative policy, the target is the amalgamation of larger municipalities in urban areas
in order to solve the problems of land zoning, common infrastructures for clusters and
to reduce tax competition within the same (but at the moment “inter-communal”)
development zone – though this is not officially expressed in these terms.
Glarus
The recent history of amalgamation in canton Glarus is also very informative of the
debate around voluntary versus compulsory amalgamation of LGUs.6 In 2005, the
canton was divided in 27 communes, 18 school districts, 16 social aid service precincts
and 9 Bürgengemeinde. The cantonal executive proposed a territorial reform to
reduce these four territorial mapping to 10 communes in charge of all these functions.
Since the proposal needed a constitutional change, the Landsgemeinde of November
3, 2006 - in Glarus, the direct assembly of citizens – was to vote the issue. But a
citizen’s proposal that 10 were too much and 3 would be better (which correspond to
the natural geography of the canton) obtained a short majority to the surprise of both
the cantonal executive and the assembly.
The Landsgemeinde decision was challenged, first in the cantonal Court, then in the
Federal Supreme Court of Justice, with the argument that the proposal for 3
communes was not made in advance and not written in the calling of the assembly.
Thus decision was not taken with full knowledge of the consequences. Eventually the
Federal Court confirmed on November 3, 2006 the validity of the proposal and the
legal obligation for the cantonal executive to re-study a new territorial map with 3 and
not 10 communes. Soon, an initiative was launched by a group of citizens under the
motto “a reform for efficient, democratic and fair LGUs in a dynamic cantonal setting”
in order to return to 10 communes. The initiative succeeded and, for the first time
since the 1887 cantonal Constitution, an extraordinary Landsgemeinde was to debate
the issue on November 25, 2007. The reform with three new communes was
confirmed. The new communes have been enforced on January 1, 2011.
In both cases (10 or 3 LGUs), the government’s arguments were that the reform
should simplify the territorial mapping, regroup functions under a unique local
institution in order to increase efficiency in the production and delivery of local public
services, administrative simplicity and better management, political accountability,
enlarged financial and political powers vis-à-vis the canton and increased autonomy of
decision.

6

Web page of canton Glarus, www.gl.ch/xml_1/internet/de/application/d578/f598.cfm “Gemeindereformen”. Also http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glarner_Gemeindereform
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2 Too many too small LGUs ?
The usual argument for the amalgamation of LGUs is that many of them are too small
to perform economically and efficiently the functions assigned to them. The
assumption is that for a large proportion of local collective service the production
function takes a U-shape curve with decreasing average costs, mainly due to the
importance of infrastructure and fixed operating costs. In other words, the “size” of
the political territory is smaller than the “optimal functional” size of the producing
jurisdiction, service per service. Thus it would be sound economic management to
enlarge the former to coincide with the latter. This argumentation runs along the
traditional fiscal federalism theory of the optimal size of service precincts. But, this
assertion raises two questions in practice: what is too small and why?
What is too small?
When the “size” of LGUs is not adequate, what is the reference: the number of
residents in a commune, the number of beneficiaries of local public services, the
population density or the area to be covered? The usual theoretical answer is the
number of service users or beneficiaries; and the geographical landscape of the model
is flat. But this is not so in practice.
Take the example of primary school. Beneficiaries are the school-aged children, neither
the residents nor the voters. Yet the number of beneficiaries (the “optimal” N in the Ucurve) cannot be counted as a direct reference because school-aged children are
distributed in level-classes: thus the “optimal” size does not simply depend on the
number, but also on the preferred organisation of level-classes. And it may well be
that a LGU accepts (prefers) three classes with two levels each in its own school
building rather than a school with six one level-classes in a larger school district. In this
case, the medium term demography of LGUs (actual and future proportion of schoolaged children to population) and the school organisation are additional variables. And
since the map is no flat, distance and topography may also play a crucial role.
Therefore there is no general answer to this example which needs case to case analysis
– even though the economic arguments of economies of scale, decision costs and local
preferences partly hold in all circumstances.
Another difficulty appears when local services are partially substitutes. Take the
example of family and medical home care versus residential houses for elderly people.
In the aging process, the need for one service or the other is not edge cut, but a grey
zone leaving place for appreciation. Yet the production functions are clearly different,
almost constant average costs for care at home, and U-shaped with a limit of capacity
for residence (Blum, 2008: 97-99). Up to a certain point, the need for a larger
functional jurisdiction will clearly depends on local preference for one type of care or
the other, proximity and the demographic distribution in the concerned LGUs. The
debate for the centralization of maternity is of the same vein: proximity, quality of the
service, professional ability of the doctors and nurses, sophistication of the technical
equipment are most often mentioned. Answers are various and do not stem from
financial and managerial arguments only.
Yet, even if one accepts that in the three above examples, the functional dimensions
exceed the institutional territories and enlargement is appropriate, the new functional

10
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perimeters needs not be the same. The open question is thus what could be the
adequate size of the new enlarged political jurisdiction for a functional “basket” with
the three functions?
Why too small?
In textbook fiscal federalism, the traditional explicative variables around the issue are:
the homogeneity /heterogeneity of individual preferences for local public goods and
services, possible economies of scale, geographical externalities (positive) and
congestion costs due to commuters, information and decision costs (Oates, 1972: 3853; King, 1996: 55-76; Swianiewicz, 2002: 10-11). The question is whether empirical
studies confirmed this approach, or add other additional criteria. Table 4 summarizes
the methods and results for the canton of Fribourg. Focusing on one canton is
interesting for four reasons: (i) the institutional environment is homogenous through
time; (ii) the period considered (1967-2010) is long enough to present robust results;
(iii) the amalgamation policy in this canton has developed in three phases: 1974-1999,
2000-2005 and 2011-2018, with specific changes in the financial incitation of the
canton to encourage voluntary merging of LGUs; (iv) two documents from the cantonal
Executive (1999 and 2010) allow to confront the respective arguments of the canton
and its communes.
Four categories of reasons can be observed: financial arguments, efficiency in the
production and delivery of local public services, political institution and participative
democracy. The first two categories appear throughout the reference periods and
sound familiar: LGUs should offer local public services, efficiently produced and
delivered [2 below] under the budget constraint [1] with a view to maximising the
fiscal differential if they want to remain attractive in fiscal competition. Categories [3]
and [4] relate to the institutional position of local elected executive and, more
recently, to participative democracy – two outsiders in the fiscal federalism literature.
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Main reasons advocated for amalgamations of LGUs, canton of Fribourg
Case study
canton
N of almagamation
period
method

Financial argument
1 the negative fiscal position under a hard budget constraint;
2 weak financial position prior to amalgamation
3 increase tax potential or lower fiscal stress

Dafflon
1998
Fribourg
32
1967-1999

Cantonal Executive
1999
Fribourg
decret
2000 - 2005

text analysis 1)

text analysis 2)

x

28
X

4 increase financial or investment capacity
5 financial aid of the canton
6 too much reliance on fiscal equalization
7 cantonal pressure
Production and delivery of services
8 economies of scale
9 increased efficiency in the production of services
10 new demands from residents
the possibility for the recipient municipality to extend its
11
development zone
the need for coordination in the technical provision of local public
12
services
13 increasing complexity in existing function
better vertical assignment of functions between the canton and the
14
communes
Political institution, executive
15 the difficulty to find candidate for the local executive
16 better efficacity of elected

Zbinden
2008
Fribourg
56
1999-2006
author’s
questionnaire
appreciation (52 returned)

x

42
35
36

x

35
44

Guerry-Berchier
2009
Fribourg
37
2000-2006
questionnaire
(31 returned)

21 equal; 3 increased;
4 decreased
7

Cantonal Executive
2010
Fribourg
law
2012-2018
text analysis 3)

X

X
2
X

48
X

x
13
4

x
X
14

X

x

3
35

the rationalization of municipal management and mutual interest in
15
36
"central"
administrative efficiency,
participative democracy
18 increased autonomy
40
24 equal ; 8 better
X
19 political weight in horizontal and vertical negotiations
11
1) Minutes of the meetings of local executives and local citizens' assemblies ; 2) Message du 12 octobre 1999 relatif à l'encouragement aux fusions de communes ; 3) Message du 21 septembre 2010
accompagnant le projet de loi sur l'encouragement aux fusions de communes.
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[1] On local public finances, the “hard” budget constraint is an essential explicative
variable for pushing LGUs towards amalgamation. It must be noted that the cantonal
legislation on the organisation and functioning of local government requires a
balanced current budget, including amortization of the debt respecting the pay-as-youuse principle.7 If this is not respected, taxation must be increased. Two correlated
arguments are the necessity to reduce the tax stress – partly with regard to horizontal
tax competition – and the need for LGUs to propose new investment projects for
maintaining or increasing the “attractiveness” for residents or activities. One
interesting argument is the need to pool the tax bases for reasons of risk aversion and
sustainability in the local budgets.
[2] Gaining efficiency in the production and delivery of local public service corresponds
to the textbook arguments: economies of scales, local preferences (“new demands”)
and horizontal coordination (a term which probably corresponds to geographical
externalities or spillovers rather to congestion costs – owing to the small size of LGUs
in the canton).
[3] The institutional category relates to the position of the elected executive, on one
side, and the general administrative management of LGUs. The first argument is the
difficulty of finding a sufficient number of good candidates for local executives in a
system where this position is exercised by non-professional politicians, besides their
own professional activities.8 This situation already existed prior to 2000, but the stress
appears to have increased more recently. Second, larger local government can provide
better qualified professional profiles to unload elected executives from managerial and
pure administrative tasks - a situation that may lead to more public interest and
participation in local politics.
[4] The last group of reasons for amalgamation corresponds to participative
democracy. It can be explained in the following way (Dafflon, 2000: 846-850 ; Perritaz,
2003b: 265-271 ). Swiss LGUs have a long tradition in the search for productive
efficiency and minimum average unit cost in the production and delivery of local public
services. If “small is beautiful”, one also knows that it can be expensive. Thus for
decades, LGUs have engaged in horizontal cooperation in order to minimize costs, size
economies of scales and internalize geographical externalities. Based on a
questionnaire to which 2391 LGUs answered (82% return), Ladner et al. (2000: 71)
7

This corresponds to the revisited ‘golden rule’ that requires balance or surplus on the current budget
and accepts borrowing only for investment purposes. “Revisited” because the debt resulting from
investment must be reimbursed on the pay-as-you-use basis, that is on a linear basis within a period of
time that corresponds to the effective use of the infrastructure (33 years for a school building = 3%
annual amortization), with the argument that after the referred period of time, rehabilitation of the
property will be costly despite correct annual maintenance expenditures.
In the canton of Fribourg, if current expenditures including interest and debt installment exceed
revenues (2% at the cantonal level, 5% at the local level in the budget as well as in the account balance),
taxation on income and business profit must be increased to restore balance. The constraint is “hard”
not only with regard to this rule but also because more than 95 per cent of local revenues are own
revenues for mandated functions as well as for own expenditure choices.
8
In Switzerland, except in large cities and urban areas, most members of LGUs' executives are not
professional. They often not only bear political responsibilities but also accomplish administrative and
managerial tasks. Resignations during the legislative period (4 or 5 years depending of the canton) for
professional reasons and too much work load in the commune is frequent.
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estimated at 21 697 the number of LGUs’ engagements in horizontal cooperation in 33
local functions. The six functions at the top were primary school (76% of the
communes), medical care (70%); waste water treatment (66%); drinking water (63%);
civil defence (62%) and care to elderly people (58%). Decisions in specific service
precincts organised under public administrative law are in the hand of delegates who
are appointed by LGUs’ executive (only in a few cantons, designated by the LGU’s local
assembly), and vote freely. With the multiplicity of special service precincts, which
cover different functional territories (each corresponding to another club of LGUs),
transparency is questioned and direct democratic decisions at the local level – citizens’
assemblies and local parliaments – are fading away. The amalgamation of LGUs that
all belong to several same service precincts could internalize horizontal cooperation
and restore direct decision of local voters. This argument is at the core of the concept
of “noyaux forts” developed by Dafflon (2000).
The cantonal arguments
The cantonal interest in voluntary amalgamation of LGUs (yellow shaded in Table 4) is
indirect in comparison to those related in textbook fiscal federalism. Access to
economies of scale (productive efficiency and cost saving) and increased tax potential
will produce better financial results of the communes, which in turn will facilitate the
vertical re-assignment of functions between the canton and LGUs (larger and
financially healthier communes can do more), which will in turn reduce the need for
fiscal equalization.9 Of course, the cantons also provide arguments which appeal to
LGUs: it would be easier to find candidates for the executive because the tasks would
be more interesting, autonomy is increased. In the 2010 message (BCG, 2010: 2146
and 2260) the arguments are given without detail: amalgamation would increase
productive efficiency, financial and investment capacity and restore local autonomy!
3 Five problems with horizontal cooperation
Whereas horizontal cooperation at the local level in the form of functional jurisdictions
and ad hoc service precincts resolve the economic problem of too small municipalities,
it also creates a new situation and the emergence of new difficulties. One category of
difficulties arises because of the institutional arrangement. The other big problem is
the lack of transparency due to the multiplication of territorial divisions, possibly one
for each local responsibility. All these problems, latent in the late 1980s and left aside
because priority was given to economic efficiency and to the need of accessing to new
services, became evident in the last decade. They can be explained under the five
following caps: (i) the principal – agent problem; (ii) Information asymmetry; (iii) moral
hazard; (iv) the lack of transparency resulting from the excessive complication in the
territorial organization of local public services and (v) less participative democracy.
The principal – agent problem
In a local parliamentary democracy, resident voters are principals who elect the LGU’s
executive. Local elected (acting as first agent) are responsible for the provision of
9

In Fribourg, revenue equalization, based on RTS (eight tax sources) and LGUs’ potential tax capacity is
horizontal. Expenditure needs equalization is vertical, funded by the canton, and correspond to 50% of
the revenue equalization annual fund. Thus, better tax potential reduces the need for revenue
equalization and in a domino effect the amount that the canton will pay for expenditure needs
equalization. See Dafflon 2010.
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(offer) but do not produce themselves local public services. In turn the LGU’s
executives (in the role of second principal) contract out the production of local public
services either directly to local civil servants (in house production) or indirectly to
private enterprises (second agents). From the point of view of the production of local
public service, this process is characterised by a chain of "principal – agent" relations.

Figure 5 The “principal-agent” chain in horizontal cooperation

Local voters and
residents

Local elected
executives

First principal

First agent
Second principal
+

Second principal
Second principal
Second principal
Second principal
Second principal

Local bureau and
administration
(in house)
Second agent
Outsourcing:
Private companies
Third agent
Association of
communes
Second agent

Bureau and
administration of the
association
(in house)

Third principal

With inter-communal horizontal cooperation, the problem is more intricate since "the
second" principal is no longer unique: several LGUs have to accord each other and
share the same policy approach and to associate – which is not evident – in order to
produce more efficiently (economies of scale, spillovers and the like) a local service.
But the communal executives (who are second principals with regard to their own
residents) will delegate representatives in the association. The association executive
becomes responsible for the offer, but will not execute itself the demand. It will
command the production and organise the delivery of the service either through its
own production facilities or through outsourcing. In this situation the association
becomes at the same time the agent of the cooperating communes (it receives the
task to offer the service) and the third principal vis-à-vis the producing unit (public or
private) which is the third agent in the chain.

Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry arises before and after association with different degrees.
First, during the negotiation to form the association, the “first” and “second” principals
try to obtain as much information as possible about the agent before the contract is
signed or before the cooperative institution is created. Normally the agent is not ready
to depart from strategic information he might have and behaves consequently. At this
stage, however, the room for manoeuvre of the agent is not as large as it is in the
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subsequent phases: the principal can always refuse to associate if he feel that the
information is insufficient of biased.
But the situation changes considerably in production and delivery of the local service,
once the association exists – if only because then “exit” is expensive. The agent can
use his competencies, his managerial capacity and his knowledge of the production
function in order to reach his own targets. He can introduce innovative procedure
without transferring his knowledge to the principal. He can also attract part of the
economies of scale for his own benefit (rent seeking from his point of view; Xinefficiencies from the point of view of the local residents: they do not obtain the full
economies of scale in lower tax prices).
The first problem (represented with the dotted arrow in figure 5) is how the
information circulates from the production unit to the residents in the communes, and
how the residents can control the production unit so that the service corresponds to
their preference (in the alternative “voice” rather than “exit”). The second problem is
that this model must be duplicated for all local public services which need horizontal
cooperation.
Moral hazard
In the principal-agent chain, the moral hazard comes from the fact that once he is
chosen, the agent who becomes the second principal will not necessarily defend the
interest of the residents (first principal). He may not engage in exactly the same
provision of local public services. The agent uses the room of manoeuvre that his
knowledge of the production function gives him, his managerial capacities, uncertainty
and the principal's lack of information to fulfil his own internal requirements. And this
is duplicated in the third chain, between the association and the production unit.
Therefore, in addition to uncertainty, the principal does not know how his agent will
behave strategically (in the worst case, there is a problem of adverse selection). With
many local public services, the same problem repeats itself as many times.
Excessive complication in the territorial organization
With the system of inter-communal functional jurisdictions, and in reference to Oates'
model, any resident would belong to and participate to as many jurisdictions as the
number of local public service he requires. Moreover, since the special dimension of
the production functions differs from one service to the other, there is the additional
difficulty to understand a multitude of different service boundaries and territorial
organization. There is no reason to believe that the territorial map of primary school
districts should overlap exactly the territorial map of individual social aid or the
distribution of water, for example. The consequences are both higher information
costs and lack of transparency in the general territorial mapping of services.
Less participative democracy
In terms of participative democracy, the production and delivery of local services in
intercommunal association mean that citizens (residents, beneficiaries) cannot obtain
informed and accountable answers for their questions from the local councillors about
these service deliveries since the latter have no direct access to these functions. Or
one would have to involve oneself in understanding the functioning and management
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of as many service precincts as the number of local services he would use. The option
“voice” is considerably degraded: this situation is named "democratic deficit".
In most Swiss cantons the rules that apply to special districts or functional jurisdictions
are not the same than the rules that apply to single municipalities. Box 6 summarizes
the differences. The discussion usually focuses on two dimensions:
- democracy: what institutional structure can best secure the citizens’ control over
local government and over the management of the functional jurisdiction providing
the local public service?
- accountability: how to secure the fiscal and budget responsibility of the functional
jurisdiction?
Box 6 points out the relative differences in participative democracy for local residents
in the canton of Fribourg, when decision for the provision of local public services are
taken in the municipality of residence (left column) or within special service precinct of
which the municipality of residence is a member (right column). Similar reasoning must
be provided for each canton to adapt to its specific democratic rules.
Box 6

Comparative institutional characteristics (canton of Fribourg)
Single municipality

Special district or functional jurisdiction or
association of communes

in direct democracy, residents are members of
the local assembly; in local parliamentary
democracy, members of the local parliament
are elected

no direct democracy; the local representatives in
the jurisdiction's assembly of delegates are
designated by the local executives

executive councillors are elected

the management board is designated by the
assembly of delegates

the assignment of functions respects the
principle of subsidiarity [devolution]

authority is delegated [the statutes of the
functional jurisdiction must list explicitly the
domains of activities]

tax capacity

No tax capacity. Funding is guaranteed through
financial transfers from member municipalities.

fiscal responsibility and accountability

no financial and budgetary accountability: excess
of current expenditures over finance are covered
according to a share that has to figure in the
statutes and can neither be disputed nor escaped;
deficit bail out and borrowing limits are written
in the statutes.

Facultative referendum

Referendum on the communes' adhesion to the
jurisdiction, but none thereafter on the
jurisdiction's current business.

In direct democracy: none, decisions can be
challenged within the assembly;
In local parliamentary democracy: new
investment, taxes, user charges, general
regulation, horizontal cooperation; the number
of members in the executive or in the legislative
assembly.

New functions must be decided by vote in the
individual communes and need the unanimity of
the communes

Initiative

New investments within the statutory task(s) of
the association; general regulation; financial
guarantee; PPP participation; changes in the
statutes.

In direct democracy, on all items in the
competence of the assembly;
In local parliamentary democracy: new
investments, general communal regulation and
horizontal cooperation in the form of
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association and functional jurisdiction.
Source: Fribourg cantonal law of September 25, 1980 on the organization and function of local
governments ( as on September21, 2011; web page of Canton of Fribourg, > legislation)

At this point, the global policy problem can be formulated in the following way. If one
accepts that there are too many too small LGUs in terms of population and service
beneficiaries, the necessity for enlarging institutional jurisdictions into larger functional
service precincts is evident for reason of managerial capacity, efficiency and
economies of scales in the production of local public service, internalization of
spillovers and the like. The arguments correspond largely to what fiscal federalism
says. There is no need to amalgamate: there exists a large variety of legal form for
horizontal cooperation which can serve, including outsourcing. The problem arises
with the multiplicity of territorial mappings of service precincts, with different limits
each for a specific service. The complex overlapping network of service precincts does
not respect the criteria of transparency, accountability, participative democracy.
In other words, if the residents’ preferences are homogeneous for the service provided
in association, if the “distance” between the beneficiaries’ demand and the actual
production and delivery of the service is “short”, and if residents and beneficiaries
consider only the utility of the specific service obtained, then the “democratic deficit”
will remain low and the multiple mapping of functional jurisdictions can be
maintained. Yet if citizens consider that LGUs are more than some kind of
“supermarket” for delivering services, but are locus where social life must be organized
and (the basket of) local public services are part of this design, then the need to
restore voice and participative democracy will drive to the need for a unique, yet
enlarged locus. Amalgamation provides a possible answer. The resulting situation
becomes complex because the analysis leaves the realm of economic and managerial
arguments for social consideration and citizenship, variables that are far more difficult
to isolate and measure.
This can be represented in Figure 7. Economic arguments are output-oriented: how to
produce local public services at the lowest possible cost. The net benefits of horizontal
cooperation first increase; but with the multiplication of service mapping, problems of
institutional democracy, accountability and transparency appear and become more
and more significant. The “voice” alternative (information, expression of preferences,
accountability and control) is fading away. Amalgamation of LGus would save both
situations: remaining large to maintain efficiency, internalizing in the new enlarged
institutional border as many functional entities as possible, so that the exercise of
“voice” would be possible again. However the total efficiency gain cannot be
internalized after amalgamation: in a dynamic setting, horizontal cooperation will
remain necessary for some functions.
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Figure 7 The cost-benefit line of horizontal cooperation and amalgamation
Net advantage of horizontal cooperation
+
INPUT – OUTPUT
Amalgamation of LGUs

OUTPUT oriented
efficiency, economies of scales,
internalization of congestion costs

DEMAND oriented
Inflexion point

-

further horizontal
cooperation are
not interesting

Number of
horizontal
cooperations

loss of acceptance,
proximity and legitimacy

Net cost of horizontal cooperation

4 What next ? The “noyaux forts”
The concept of “noyaux forts” is based on the observation of actual institutions and
various mappings of horizontal cooperation per function with the idea of consolidating
several functional territories in one new enlarged LGU. Starting from existing
cooperation agreements between LGUs, the concept distinguishes first the production
of public utilities from local collective services.
For public utilities (drinking water, waste water treatment, solid waste collection and
treatment, public transports, and the like), efficiency and managerial argument are
essential. Case studies and field observations reveal that there is no ethical and social
issues in provision and production. The functional size should optimize productive
efficiency. In addition, since these services being financed according to the user-pays
and polluter-pays principles, there are less problem of rent-seeking or X-inefficiency,
information costs, accountability and control. Beneficiaries pay the service according
to their individual demand; benchmarking between neighbouring service precincts
facilitates performance measurement and control.
For local service using human resources or which social content counts (first instance
civil justice, civil protection, proximity police, sport centre, kindergarten, primary
school, leisure and social activities, public libraries, parish, home care), the existing
interaction between people from neighbouring communes is central; human contact
and distance play key roles. The concept is to reorganise the political communes which
already cooperate in several of the listed domains in a new enlarged political entity
which approximates as much as possible the functional limits.
Starting from the territorial divisions of existing inter-communal cooperative
arrangements for various functions [SA in Figure 8 Phase 1, and similar for SB, SD, SE, SF ],
this approach examines if and how a new unique, enlarged, multifunctional territorial
can be constructed. This would create a new commune. In a first experimentation in
the canton of Fribourg (Dafflon, 2000), the functional jurisdictions that were selected
were: (i) micro regions which received federal and cantonal development grants; (ii)
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judicial courts of first instance; (iii) fire defence units; (iv) civil defence special districts;
(v) sectors with sport facilities; (vi) primary school districts; (vii) 300-meters shooting
associations; (viii) parishes. If and where LGs cooperate in at least five out of these
eight functions, then it would be possible to create a "noyaux forts" (Phase 2 in Figure
8), institutionalised in a new and larger municipality. The concept is simple on first
sight, but it hides redoubtable institutional problems in order to restore “voice” of the
residents citizens and dissolve certain political advantages and bureaucratic cushions

Figure 8 The creation of new enlarged LGUs with the method of “noyaux forts”
Phase 1

The constitution of a functional service precinct SA with seven communes
Ci, i = 1 to 7
C6

C1
C7

C5

C2
C3

function A

C4

Phase 2

Ad hoc
service
precinct
SA

When several functional jurisdictions overlap, it should be possible to
consolidate the members LGUs in a new larger commune
SD

SA
C1
C7

C2

C4 C3
SB

“noyau fort”

SF
SE

Functions
SA+B+D+E+F are
internalized
in the new
LGU

new larger municipality formed
by C1+C2+C3+C4+C7

In Figure 8 Phase 2, five communes [C1, C2, C3, C4 and C7] share the same five functions
[SA+B+D+E+F]. They could amalgamate in one new larger LGU. C5 and C6 do not share all
these functions. They may nevertheless merge. If not, the new LGU must accept to
deliver the services to them on a contractual basis, with due contributions by the client
LGUs. In this new “territorial = functional” configuration, residents of five LGUs will
regain direct command (“voice”) over five functions, a situation which improves
participative democracy, reduces administrative costs (the five administration of the
service precincts can be exercised in the new LGU) without any hindrance on the
economies of scale which existed in the service precincts (the beneficiaries have not
changed with the amalgamation). Of course, the selected functions which are referred
in this first experiment must be adapted from one canton to another according to the
functions assigned at the local level. But the concept remains unchanged: public
utilities are not considered; labor intensive service and services with social sensitive
outcome serve.
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When implemented in Fribourg, the method would reduce the number of LGUs from
245 to 89 (Dafflon, 2000: 855). Only 30 communes would not be concerned.10 Under
this new concept, from 2000 to 2011, 44 voluntary amalgamations were decided,
concerning 122 LGUs and reducing their number from 245 (1999) to 167 (2011). Eleven
amalgamations exactly correspond to the planned “noyaux forts”; 32 partially
correspond (which means that not all LGUs in the given “noyau fort” merged); one
amalgamation is outside the proposal. Only 12 LGUs did merge within a “noyau fort”
different from the one proposed through the method.
5 Financial support from the cantons
The cantonal supports to LGUs’ voluntary amalgamation take three forms:
(1) A general indicative planning for a voluntary amalgamation policy in the canton
(see Table 3 above). This helps in the sense that the cantonal policy is founded on prestudies of the LGUs general public finance situation (time series data on expenditures,
taxation, existing horizontal coordination), in some cases in relation with other policies
(balanced budget constraint, investment policy, fiscal equalization, tax apportionment,
for example). These preparative studies help in assessing the LGUs’ financial positions
on comparative bases (cantonal benchmarks).
(2) Technical and administrative support to LGUs which engage in an amalgamation
process; also financial support in Luzern, Neuchâtel and Sankt-Gall in form of
participation to the costs of the amalgamation study and process. The technical
support consists of preparing the agenda for amalgamation: what to do, when, in
which sequence; and also in analysing the public finance situation of the LGUs
candidates to amalgamation and the prospects in case of amalgamation. The technical
support can be full (the cantonal department of municipal affair takes the technical
leads) or takes the form of ad hoc contribution in the process (normally the communes
will outsource the study).
(3) Direct unconditional block grants paid to the new amalgamated commune. This is
usually the main cantonal policy incentive. There are two ways for calculating the
cantonal financial aid: ad hoc in five cantons (Aargau, Graubünden, Luzern, Sankt-Gall
and Ticino); formula based (all the other cantons).
Ad hoc financial support
Ad hoc financial support means that there are variables enumerated in the cantonal
law on the encouragement to LGUs amalgamation which needs calculations or
estimations (normally by the canton) to obtain the amount to be paid.
The incitation consist in (i) calculating the financial and structural disabilities which
exist between the poorest or the less developed LGU in the amalgamation and a
benchmark detailed in the law and (ii) compensate for the differences. Usual
benchmarks are either the variable average for the LGUs engaged in the amalgamation
or the “best” position for each variable. It is never some sort of “cantonal average” for

10

Details of the study can be obtained with the author. The same method was applied for the cantons of
Vaud, Jura and Ticino. See Table 3 above.
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the relevant variables. Thus the financial aid is relative to the group of LGUs candidates
for amalgamation within a delimited territory.
The most common variables are:
- public indebtedness per capita;
- tax effort (considering the surtax on direct taxation, sometimes also user charges);
- differences in the infrastructures and equipment of the communes;
- exceptional needs, considering that certain investment are necessary for the viability
of the new commune, which costs cannot be left to the new LGU after amalgamation.
The basic hypothesis is that despite all economic or democratic arguments for
amalgamation, disparities in the financial position of the candidate LGUs can be an
obstacle to amalgamation. No voter will happily accept a higher tax burden in order to
“bail out” neighbouring communes in the process.
The cantons have an interest in the success of amalgamation: the re-assignment of
functions can be eased; the LGUs’ balanced budget constraint is more easily respected;
risk-sharing through a larger local tax base increases fiscal sustainability; the necessity
of an equalization policy is reduced.
Formula based
Formula base incentive grants can be expressed with the following general formula:

IG
CHF
H
i
n
IFC
m

incentive grant
the amount of grant per capita
the number of residents
for LGU candidate to amalgamation
the number of LGUs in the referred amalgamation
indicator of financial capacity
encouragement factor that increases with n

Most cantonal formulas are lump sum and use only the two first terms within *…+ in
the equation above. Actually, the amount per capita varies from 100 to 600 CHF (see
Table 9). Multiplied by the number of resident, it simply means that the relative
disabilities of the LGUs engaged in amalgamation are not taken into consideration. This
implies homogeneity of the financial and structural positions of the LGUs engaged in
the process of amalgamation. If not, large non-compensated disparities would most
certainly conduce to negative votes in the better-off LGUs.
Table 9 Amounts of financial incentives in selected cantons
Canton
Per capita amount in CHF
Year of implementation
Number of (-) LGUs (from
the following year to 2011)

Solothurn
100
2005

Vaud
250
2004

Fribourg
400
1999

Neuchâtel
400
2003

Bern
400
2004

Jura
500
2004

Valais
600
2005

-4

-6

-75

-9

-15

-19

-8
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Three cantons (Neuchâtel and Jura, Fribourg between 2000 and 2005) are weighting
the population number with an inverse index of a financial (tax) capacity. Tax capacity
indices are generally used in revenue equalization. The assertion, in the formula, is
that “rich” LGUs participating into the amalgamation process should not receive the
full per capita incentive grant because their financial position is already confortable.
This variable has been debated in many cantons and abandoned because it mixes
equalization with the amalgamation policy, something which goes against the
Tinbergen “one goal on instrument” rule in policy implementation.11 It could also
induce wealthier LGUs not to engage in amalgamation because the aid received is
judged insufficient.
Finally, the variable m tries to influence the size of the new LGU in increasing the per
capita grant in function of the number of communes finally merged. Here the incentive
from the cantonal point of view is to obtain in each amalgamation the number of LGUs
according to the concept of “noyaux forts”– a situation which is not yet realised (see
Table 3, last column right). The m values are:
n
m
m

1
1
1

2
1
1

3
1.1
1.25

4
1.2
1.50

5
1.3
1.75

…
+ 0.1
+0.25

Berne, Fribourg, Vaud
Valais

The advantage of the formula based incentive grant is that it is transparent from the
outset and not negotiable. The canton has no room of manoeuvre; but it is easy to
manage. The hidden inconvenient is that it does not take into consideration LGUs’
disabilities in the amalgamation process. Whatever the formula is, wealthier LGUs can
always calculate the amount that would be necessary to compensate financial
disabilities: comparing debt per capita, the surtax on direct taxation or the
performance of the user-pays and polluter-pays principles in specific environmental
functions is not too difficult. Measuring differences in the infrastructure equipment is
more intricate. But, suppose this calculation is possible: if [ ∑ disabilities > IGN ] then
the risk is high that taxpayers and voters in the richer LGUs will not accept the
amalgamation.
6 Conclusion
What can be concluded from the Swiss debate and practices in LGUs amalgamation
cantonal policies?
 The policy path does only and very partially coincide with the textbook fiscal
federalism arguments on the optimal size of “government” (which are in fact
“service precinct”).
 Voluntary LGUs’ amalgamation is feasible, but need guidance and strong
commitment from the higher government layer.
 An explicit policy programme is necessary, with the indication of the relevant
variables which are important for the canton and for the LGUs. These variables are
not only economic, but also institutional, and democratic.
11
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 There needs to be a proposal with a tentative new territorial design after
implementation of the policy agenda mentioned above.
 A large consultation of local actors about the canton’s proposals must be
organised. Local stakeholders have to appropriate the policy proposals since the
final decision belongs to the local level.
 Cantonal technical and financial support for and during the process of
amalgamation would be opportune.
 Financial incentive in the form of unconditional block grant should be paid to the
amalgamated units in order to compensate (partly) LGUs’ relative disabilities.
Calculation criteria must be explicit, fixed in the law and known in advance.
Finally, one last word is needed on measuring the performance of the cantonal
amalgamation policies. In my experience, this is impossible mission. There are a
number of reasons. First, for the moment (but further research on this theme is
pursued), it is not possible to establish a significant and robust relation between the
per capita amount of the cantonal aids and the number of amalgamation (see Table 9).
The second argument is that if the mains reasons for amalgamation are related to the
recovery of participative democracy at the grass roots level and a regain of LGUs
autonomy, the measure of the performance becomes highly subjective and
controversial. It can be evaluated through surveys and questionnaires, but who will be
questioned: residents, voters, beneficiaries, taxpayers, the electorate, elected
members of local parliament, elected executive members, administrative personal?
Existing surveys of this sort show as large and disparate answers as possible. How do
we measure “voice” and political autonomy, or simply financial autonomy (Blöchliger
and King, 2006; Dafflon and Madies, 2009: 61-69)? The only undisputable quantitative
answer would be to count how many horizontal inter-communal cooperation contracts
and arrangements would be internalised after amalgamation.
Economic objectives (economies of scale, productive efficiency, spillovers, congestion
costs) would be difficult to measure because the other environmental variables are
dominant. In the Swiss case, since the mid 1990ies there has been a number of reassignment of functions between cantons and the communes; since 2008, this has
been exacerbated through a domino effect by the re-assignment of function between
the federal layer and the cantons. Also expenditure data would not give the answer
since in most cantons, equalization contributions and payments based on expenditure
needs modify the communal outlays: one would have to clean expenditure data from
the equalising component in order to trace the real expenditures based on causality
and, thus, construct the production functions – the only way to trace efficiency
variation in production and delivery of the local public services. In so doing, beside the
technical problems, it would be difficult to isolate the incidence due to amalgamation
alone. Analogous reasoning can be proposed on the tax side. Amalgamation as such
does not increase the tax base: in the new LGUs it will be the sheer addition of
previous LGUs’ tax base. The argument is that the enlarge tax base somehow reduces
the risk of economic downturns on the tax yield: but this depends on the distribution
of the tax bases in the different economic activities and cannot be assessed in general.
Again, the only firm calculation which can be proposed in the budgetary context is to
assess the possible economies in regrouping several communal administrative units in
one because it reduces the administrative costs of cooperation units that are

24

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

internalised in the new LGU with amalgamation. This is not an easy task if the
amalgamation gives at the same time an opportunity to increase the technical capacity
and abilities of the new LGU’s bureaux.
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